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Abstract 
This thesis is about some of the effects and implications that tax havens have on our financial 
markets. It focuses on giving the reader a better understanding of the consequences that tax 
havens impose to our financial markets using the financial crisis that started in 2007 as an 
example. The first chapter has a brief introduction that lays the foundation of the thesis. The 
second chapter defines and explains many different types of tax havens that exist worldwide. 
The third part considers the corporate structures found in tax havens and their respective use. 
The fourth chapter discusses the link between the financial markets and tax havens, and also 
explains the different structured derivatives used in tax havens. The final chapter uses the 
financial crisis to illustrate some of the effects that are created by tax havens. This chapter 
also discusses the future of tax havens, provides a conclusion of the thesis and some 
suggestions for preventing a possible future where tax havens continue to pose as a threat and 
create uncertainties in our financial systems. 
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1 Introduction 
Tax havens are located in more and more well-known locations worldwide and are not as 
hidden as they may seem to be. Tax havens are fast growing and are starting to get more 
acknowledged for the convenient solutions they provide to financial markets. However, it does 
exist many different opinions regarding the understanding of the effects the tax havens have on 
the financial markets.  
The thesis will concentrate on the connection between the tax havens and the financial markets. 
After the financial crisis began in 2007 have the tax havens regained more attention and the 
hunt for reducing tax evasion was resumed with more authority and determination. This also 
caused and raised a lot of interesting questions: How was the financial crisis affected by tax 
havens? What part do the tax havens play in the financial market today? What kind of corporate 
structures are found in tax havens and are these structures found elsewhere as well? These are 
some of the challenging questions I am going to focus on and try to answer and discuss in the 
best possible way. 
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2 Tax haven – what is it and how does it work? 
This chapter will focus on describing some of the different definitions of tax havens and then 
try to discuss critically these definitions using other approaches. The last part of the chapter 
will discuss the different characteristics of tax havens and try to explain why some countries 
become tax havens.  
2.1 Definition 
Tax haven is not a very precise and accurate term. There are a lot of different definitions, and it 
seems to be that no specific definition is recognized and accepted worldwide. The problem with 
narrowing down to one definition can be illustrated by all the names that are attached to the 
phenomenon: Tax haven, Free Trade zone, Offshore Financial Centre, Tax Relief Zone among 
many other names. One way to consider it and perhaps solve the name problem would be to say 
that you can identify a tax haven as a jurisdiction with low tax or no tax. In tax havens is the tax 
rate equal to zero on capital income like for example dividend (Zimmer, 2009). Many 
jurisdictions like Ireland and the Netherlands have introduced different laws that reduce the tax 
on capital income to equal zero for foreign companies, so that these firms decide to move their 
subsidiaries into these countries (Zimmer, 2009). This is one way of attracting foreign capital 
(Zimmer, 2009). Another example to illustrate the definition uses the Norwegian tax system to 
measure: Any income or loss on a share in a company located in a tax haven, usually have an 
effective tax rate
1
 equal to less than two thirds of the effective tax in Norway (KPMG, 2012). 
However, is it more likely that the tax paid by foreign companies operating in tax havens 
equals zero (Zimmer, 2009). 
This is a start, but the definition may still be too short and vague to be accepted. There is also a 
specific difference between a tax haven and an OFC according to the OECD that should be 
mentioned (OECD, 2011b). The OECD defines OFC as: “Countries or jurisdictions with 
financial centres that contain financial institutions that deal primarily with nonresidents and/or 
in foreign currency on a scale out of proportion to the size of the host economy” (OECD, 
2011b). Enterprises based in the centre may then benefit from the tax advantages that are not 
available for businesses based outside. This definition does not involve questions related to low 
tax or the legality of these actions, as the OECD definition of tax havens does. According to the 
OECD is the OFC a jurisdiction that has more going on financially than it normally would 
                                                 
1
 Effective tax rate is the tax paid (total tax liability) after deductions such as depreciation divided by taxable 
income. 
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have, considering the conditions at the specific place. However, would many say that tax 
havens and OFC are synonyms (NOU, 2009). It could seem like the definition provided by the 
OECD of the OFC is in line with the functionality of a tax haven. There is somehow a slightly 
distinction that can be mentioned. The term modern tax havens have existed since the start of 
the twentieth century, while OFCs are phenonomens that appeared in the mid 1970s (Palan, 
2012). London was the first city that acted and operated as an OFC before spreading worldwide 
(Santillán-Salgado, 2011). The term offshore financial market is commonly used to describe the 
wholesale international financial market, also known in the past as the Eurodollar market
2
 
(Palan, 2012). This type of market takes care of any location trading in the non-resident 
currencies like the yen, swiss franc, and euro among others. In general are OFCs considered to 
be the location where such financial transactions take place among the so-called non-residents 
(Palan, 2012). Examples of such places are the British Virgin Island, Guernsey amongst other.  
The list of countries that are selected by the OECD as OFCs, are much the same as those that 
the OECD classifies as tax havens. However, there are other and different views on the 
classification of OFC. According to another source, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), are 
strong financial centres like New York, London, Singapore and Tokyo regarded as OFCs 
(International Monetary Fund, 2000). The international Monetary Fund emphasizes that the 
greatest differences between the tax havens and the OFC is the amount of value that is added to 
transactions done by non-residents (International Monetary Fund, 2000). The amount of extra 
value added is probably more usual in places like Singapore and London than in other OFC that 
are also categorized as tax havens.  
There is no general understanding of what functions are necessary for a jurisdiction to act as 
OFC (NOU, 2009).  It is however important to keep in mind the differences between the two 
terms as explained above. 
If we were to look quickly on the fundamentals behaviours involved to the existence of tax 
havens, would it be appropriate to mention three typical behaviours: Tax avoidance, tax 
planning and tax evasion (Ferreira & Madeira, 2010). It is also necessary to consider the fact 
that tax havens also offers anonymity that undermines regulation in many different areas from 
the financial market to provide incentives for illegal unregulated unreported fishing (OECD, 
2005).  
                                                 
2
 Eurodollar market is a wholesale market for the American dollar that emerged in Europe in the 1950s.  
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Tax avoidance means that an individual or a firm is using methods that are totally legal to 
minimize their state or federal income tax, estate tax or gift tax. Individuals, organizations or 
corporations usually manage this by claiming deductions and credits that are allowed. The tax 
payers are allowed to do tax avoidance in contrast to tax evasion, which is totally illegal. 
Tax evasion can be expressed as an illegal action or practice where an individual or a 
corporation avoids paying their total tax liability. If these individuals or corporations are caught 
for evading taxes are they normally charged with penalties and other criminal charges. When 
these persons, firms or legal entities intentionally avoid their tax responsibility and are caught, 
may the penalties be quite serious. The criminals can be imposed huge fines and even need to 
serve prison time. 
In order to minimize tax, all taxpayers need to arrange and do some sort of tax planning. Tax 
planning is a way to incorporate efficient elements in a financial plan in the best possible way 
to minimize tax that is efficiently from the investor’s point of view. These elements can have 
many different aspects, including the timing advantage of deferring tax payments and legally 
arrange the financial affairs to reduce tax more efficiently (Harrison, 2010). The main focus is 
generally to reduce tax liabilities and make more cash available for other investments and 
purposes.  
This brief look on some of the behaviours of tax havens somehow illustrates tax havens to a 
certain point, however is it necessary to include some key factors to get a better understanding. 
In 1998 “the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development” (OECD), submitted a 
report named “Harmful tax competition” (OECD, 1998). In the report is the OECD intending to 
define a tax haven and explain the difference between a tax haven and an OFC. The OECD 
identifies four key factors in the matter of whether a jurisdiction is a tax haven (OECD, 1998): 
1. No or only nominal taxes.  
2. Lack of effective exchange of information  
3. Lack of transparency 
4. No substantial activities 
In addition to this does the report also discuss a scenario where only parts of the internationally 
tax politics for a regime is included.  
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The key factors for identifying and assessing harmful preferential tax regimes are as follows 
(OECD, 1998). 
1. No or low effective tax rates 
2. Ring fencing of regimes 
3. Lack of transparency 
4. Lack of effective exchange of information 
I will include both lists of factors under the same aspect to not complicate things too much, and 
I am then adding the “no substantial activities” to the second list. I will also add an extra key 
factor, “no audit and accounting required”. The reason for adding this factor is because it is a 
strong indication that there may be something illegal activities going on in the respective 
jurisdiction. I then will end up with six key factors in order to qualify as a tax haven: 
1. No or low effective tax rates 
2. Lack of effective exchange of information 
3. Lack of transparency 
4. Ring Fencing of regimes 
5. No substantial activities 
6. No audit or accounting required 
There are many other factors that qualify a jurisdiction as a tax haven. These factors will be 
mentioned after a more precise and thorough description of these six key factors. 
The first key factor “no or low effective tax rates”, is fairly straight forward to explain. The 
country or state has a financial structure where it allows low taxes or no taxes for foreign 
investors. They welcome new investors and new capital and this is often the most obvious 
indication of a jurisdiction acting as a tax haven. 
“Lack of effective exchange of information” is often used as part of the protection of foreign 
investors in tax havens. Generally speaking, the problem lies in the ability or willingness to 
cooperate with the tax authorities of other countries. Why do some jurisdictions refuse to give 
out information? The most evident reason could be that they are actually hiding something. An 
example would be that a jurisdiction could decide that some relations and transactions between 
an enterprise and its clients are a business secret, and are put under some kind of  protected 
paragraph in some internationally tax law (OECD, 1998, s. 28). This law or policy could 
indicate that the jurisdiction is applying a harmful tax competition.  
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The third factor is the lack of transparency. This factor is about how uncomplicated it is for 
outsiders to get a clear impression and overlook of the tax regime in a jurisdiction. There are 
two factors that determine whether a jurisdiction is lacking transparency: The jurisdiction must 
first state clearly the rules and applicability to taxpayers so that these rules may be invoked 
against the authorities. Second and probably the most important, must the details and 
information of every taxpayer be available to other tax authorities in the countries concerned 
(OECD, 1998). Unfortunately are there many examples of failing jurisdictions that treat 
taxpayers unequal. One example could be that some tax authorities would set up favorable 
deals for a taxpayer. Another example would be that the jurisdiction is deliberately 
implementing a weak tax law that gives the taxpayer an incentive to misuse the law (OECD, 
1998). This could be due to and encouraged by corruption inside the jurisdiction, which 
especially seems to be very widespread and common in non-developed countries (NOU, 2009).   
The fourth factor is “ring fencing” of regimes and it can be described as a restriction for those 
that take advantage of the regime. Foreigners would for example not be able to start doing 
business locally or even do transactions in the domestic currency (OECD, 1998). This 
constraint may seem a bit odd, since the foreigners are permitted to establish and do business 
internationally, based from the jurisdiction.  It can however, be expressed as a defensive 
mechanism as the tax havens may be aware of the effects the tax regime may have, and tries to 
protect its domestic economy (OECD, 1998). This may seem very contradictive, since they in a 
way “admit” that their tax policy is a harmful one. The regime is in a way hedging themselves 
against adverse effects and leaves the possible problems for the countries doing “harmful” 
business in their jurisdiction.  
The “no substantial activities” factor discusses the matter whether there are any requirements 
for those who are active users of the regime. If there is not any obvious requirement or other 
mandatory demands mentioned in any laws, then it may seem evident that the foreign 
enterprises are attracted by the tax minimizing opportunities that the country provides (OECD, 
1998). Why should there else be any reason to establish a business section in the tiny island of 
Cayman? Probably not just because of the good weather.  
The last factor which contribute to the description of a tax haven is the “no audit and 
accounting” element. Tax havens do not have any accounting registers for companies. So if the 
tax authorities or the investors require or demand to look at these accounts, are they usually not 
able to find them because there is no where to look. Easily accessed accounts are very 
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important, both for the owners and the employees. It gives a better picture of the operations and 
the economic status of the company. Tax havens also do not require any audit (NOU, 2009). If 
there are any requirements of auditing of accounts are these requirements usually loosely 
worded and easily manipulated.  
There are many other factors that contribute to a successful tax haven. Non-tax factors as a 
solid infrastructure and a good regulated framework would certainly help. Tax havens are one 
of the major receivers of direct investment from rich countries. Research has shown that if 
foreign investments make the use of tax havens more appealing and cost-effective, it is natural 
to assume that the use of tax havens makes the foreign investments more attractive (Desai, 
Foley, & Hines Jr., 2006a). There are also been discovered that greater economic and financial 
activity outside tax havens results in a higher demand for tax havens. A one percent higher 
probability of establishing a tax haven affiliate is estimated to result in a 0.5% to 0.7% greater 
profit and investment growth outside of tax havens inside the same region (Desai, Foley, & 
Hines Jr., 2006a). 
The majority of the key factors mentioned as indicators of tax havens, are taken from the 
OECD report from 1998. Since then there have been some slightly changes. In July 2001, the 
US government and the Bush administration demanded that the “no substantial activities” was 
removed from the OECD list (Tax Justice Network, 2007). The OECD committee on Fiscal 
affairs eventually agreed to not include this factor in 2001, and removed it (OECD, 2011c). 
One could ask how this was possible, how could Bush pull this through and why was this issue 
an important matter? The Bush followers were generally all the rich and the religious types 
from the right side, so that can be one of the reasons why the Bush administration did 
everything they could to remove it. Empirical studies have shown us that the richest are using 
tax havens the most (Desai, Foley, & Hines Jr., 2006b). Research has provided empirical 
evidence that indicates that huge American multinational firms began to establish big 
operations in tax havens as a strategy to avoid tax. The biggest international companies that 
tend to use intra-firm trade heavily and have high research and development costs, are most 
likely to have the highest demand for tax havens (Desai, Foley, & Hines Jr., 2006b). The 
pressure to remove the factor of “no substantial activities” may then not only be put on by the 
US government, but also by many other countries and companies that had interests and strong 
attachments in tax havens.  
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The current American president, Barack Obama, does not have the same voting mass as Bush 
and exercises a different type of politics. After the financial crisis was the US in need of money 
and he announced that he would end the tax breaks for American multinational companies 
(Donmoyer, 2009). “The US has a broken tax system that is full of loopholes that makes it 
perfectly legal for companies to avoid paying their full share”, Obama stated. This was indeed 
met by skepticism by the rich democrats in Congress, but a breakthrough for a possible tax 
revolution.  
Obama passed the “The stop Tax Haven abuse act” in 2009, as a part of the growing tax haven 
problem. However, there are mixed predictions about this act and it is claimed that countries 
that are vital for it success are unlikely to agree in fully cooperation (Todero, 2010).  
The OECD definition from the 1998 report covers many important factors that somehow 
express how tax havens works and operates. This is also a good place to start and to get a good 
and a reasonable perspective of the term tax haven. I will now proceed with some other shorter 
definitions of jurisdictions claimed to be tax havens. 
2.2 Other definitions of tax havens 
The OECD definition of tax havens illustrates that it is difficult to find one sentence to describe 
tax havens. Tax havens are not the same, and they compete with each other to become the most 
interesting and attractive place to put your money (Blanco & Rogers, 2008).  
A short search on the internet leaves me with a lot of different definitions and explanations. 
Investopedia, which is a tool for economical terms, defines tax haven as: “A country that offers 
individuals and businesses little or no tax liability” (Investopedia, 2011). A short and to the 
point definition, but does it enlighten enough? An alternative definition could be the one from 
the “Trend report 2008-2009” of Økokrim: “Tax havens is the term used for countries where it 
is possible to create corporations without anyone gaining access to corporate ownership and 
control structures, where there is little or no requirement that companies pay taxes, and where 
it is also not a requirement for audit” (Økokrim, 2009). This definition is similar to the OECD 
definition, but it is probably more straightforward in determine what elements that makes tax 
havens problematic for the financial system. 
In the report “Tax havens and development; Status, analyses and measures”, by the Norwegian 
commission on capital flight from poor countries (NOU, 2009), is another perspective of the 
term tax haven discussed. The commission has not made a precise definition, but it concludes 
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that tax havens are a combination of secrecy
3
 and has a level of close to nothing or very little 
taxation. The commission emphasizes that the term tax haven is inaccurate, but is heavily and 
imprecise used in the media to describe jurisdiction that has low taxes for its economy or for 
foreign companies (NOU, 2009, s. 14). 
2.3 Criticism against the OECD definition and other tax havens 
I have now focused on different definitions of tax havens and it is now time to challenge these 
definitions with different approaches. I will also consider other jurisdictions that could be 
regarded as possible tax havens. 
The OECD of today consists of 30 countries, and the majority of them are characterized as 
jurisdictions with a high level of wealth (Globalis, 2011). The organization is generally seen as 
little politically controversial, with a counseling function rather than political. However, it may 
be argued that the organization is underestimated and has more influence. An independent 
organization that works with science, analysis and knowledge about tax and regulations, named 
Tax Justice Network (TJN), is very critical to the definition of tax haven by the OECD on many 
areas. The TJN wrote on its website about the initiative to classify different jurisdictions as tax 
havens:"This initiative is flawed, partly because it tends to reflect only the interests of rich 
OECD countries, and it fails to recognize the role that some of the world’s biggest financial 
centre’s – notably the City of London and New York – are tax havens" (Tax Justice Network, 
2011a). The allegation put towards the OECD that they are neglecting and exploiting the poor 
countries in favor of the rich countries, would probably not surprise anyone. Whether London 
and New York are considered as tax havens or OFCs, is a difficult matter to discuss. 
A journalist in the British paper “The Guardian”, James Meek, wrote an article in 2006 about 
why so many rich people tend to move to the English capital (Meek, 2006). "One explanation 
is that in the past few years London has become, even more than in the 1990s, the world's 
conduit of choice for private wealth. Its generous tax treatment of the mega-rich, particularly 
those born abroad, makes it in some ways a virtual tax haven (Meek, 2006). It can be claimed 
that we have some sort of “ring fencing” in London, a leading financial city in Europe. This of 
course is not certain facts, but still something to keep in mind. 
                                                 
3
Secrecy is for example rules and systems that prevent transparency into ownership and the activity in the 
enterprises, and the possibility of registration of tax free shell companies that in reality are running their company 
in other countries.   
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In the report “The Netherlands: A tax haven?” (Dijk, Weyzig, & Murphy, 2006), the authors 
claim that the Netherlands can be regarded as a tax haven. According to authors and the Centre 
for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO), do all their empirical evidence show that 
the Netherlands deliberately offers tax reductions on interest, dividends, royalties and capital 
gains from subsidiary companies (Weyzig & Dijk, 2007). 
There may be several things that make the Netherlands so attractive. One reason could be the 
corporate income tax exemption on dividends and capital gains for subsidiary companies based 
in foreign jurisdictions. Another could be the Double Taxation Treaty (DTT) that reduces the 
taxes on dividend and interest between the countries inside the treaty and the Netherlands.  
The Netherlands have 20000 “mailbox companies” currently that have no substantial activities 
in the country. As much as 43 % of these companies have a parent in a tax haven like the 
Cayman or British Virgin Island. This report implicates quite clearly that the Netherlands are a 
tax haven. 
A report by the Spanish observatory on Corporate Social Responsibility in March 2011, 
revealed that all the companies listed on the Spanish stock exchange are directly or indirectly 
connected with tax havens by subsidiaries (Observatorio de responsabilidad social corporativa, 
2011). The report highlights 28 Spanish enterprises that have 272 subsidiaries in 27 different 
tax haven jurisdictions. 
These recent reports and the research imply that there might be more jurisdictions that resemble 
tax havens in contrast to the list of tax havens created by the OECD. 
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2.4 Tax havens and their characteristics 
After looking at the different opinions about tax havens and discussing other jurisdictions that 
may be possible tax havens, is it now appropriate to discuss the characteristics of tax havens. I 
will focus on the list of characteristic and the criteria’s provided by the OECD. 
The OECD has developed their own list of countries that they consider as tax havens according 
to their preferences and criteria’s. This list of tax havens is updated from time to time, when for 
example countries improve or aggravate their taxation standard.  
In an OECD report from 2000, a list of 41 jurisdictions where characterized as tax havens due 
to a list of criteria’s (see table 1 on the next page). A huge weakness with the list is that the 
membership countries in the OECD are held completely outside. Countries like Ireland, Island, 
Switzerland, the Netherlands and Belgium are all OECD members, and these jurisdictions are 
countries that could qualify as tax havens according to the Tax Justice Network (Tax Justice 
Network, 2007). 
The OECD has updated the list of tax havens after 2001, and has also changed their approach 
towards the evaluation of the tax havens countries. The OECD then started to negotiate 
different agreements with the tax havens, in an attempt to prevent that these countries would act 
malicious in tax related issues. The OECD now refers to these countries as jurisdictions that are 
obliged to improve transparency and efficient exchange of information in tax related issues.  
The OECD came with an update of the level of implementations of the international taxation 
standards done by the jurisdictions considered as tax havens during the G20 summit in 2009. 
According to the update were a total of 30 jurisdictions considered to not have completely 
substantially implemented the taxation standard, while 10 were considered to have substantially 
implemented the treaty. 
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TABLE 1 OECD original list of tax havens 
Jurisdictions that was originally identified as tax havens by OECD in 2000 
American Virgin Islands (2) 
Alderney (2) 
Andorra (4) 
Anguilla (2) 
Antigua and Barbuda (2) 
Aruba (2) 
Barbados (1) 
Bahamas (2) 
Bahrain (2) 
Belize (2) 
British Virgin Islands (2)  
Cayman Islands (3) 
Cook Islands (2) 
Dominica (2) 
Gibraltar (2) 
Grenada (2) 
Guernsey(2) 
Jersey (2) 
Cyprus (3) 
Liberia (2) 
Liechtenstein (4) 
Malta (3) 
Man (2) 
Marshall Islands (2)  
Mauritsius (3) 
Monaco (4) 
Montserrat (2) 
Nauru (2) 
Netherlands Antilles (2) 
Niue (2) 
Panama (2) 
Sark (2) 
Seychellene (2) 
St Kitts and Nevis (2)  
St Lucia (2) 
St Vincent & Grenadines (2)  
Samoa (2) 
Tonga (1) 
Turks and Caicos Islands (2) 
Vanuatu (2) 
(1) Was later removed from the tax haven list 
(2) Is now identified as a cooperative jurisdiction 
(3) Was already identified as a cooperative jurisdiction before 2000 
(4) Was identified as non-cooperative jurisdiction until April 2009 
 
In 2009, another three jurisdictions where excluded from the list and the number of tax havens 
went down to 38. A new report was launched by OECD in February 2011 and it stated that only 
6 jurisdictions were characterized as tax havens, and three other financial centres had 
“committed to the internationally agreed tax standard, but have not yet substantially 
implemented” (OECD, 2011a). There was now not a single tax haven left according to OECD. 
The campaign to transform the tax havens had taken a positive turn, and it seemed like the 
OECD eventually was able to cooperate with the tax havens instead of fighting against them.  
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The OECD consists mainly of wealthy and developed countries as written in the previous part 
of the chapter. Many of the companies situated in these membership countries have subsidiaries 
or even parents in tax havens. Recently was it confirmed that 20 of the biggest companies in 
Britain were operating more than 1000 subsidiaries located in tax havens (Holmes & Hawkes, 
2011).  
Empirical evidence provided by Peter Schwarz in his article “Tax-Avoidance Strategies of 
American multinational: An empirical analysis”, claim that American multinational enterprises 
have huge benefits from using tax havens both for their American parts of the companies and 
their European subsidiaries (Schwarz, 2009). His research also concludes with that their income 
is higher due to the profit shifting, for example by retaining more income in the tax havens and 
using mainly debt for financing the subsidiaries in countries with higher tax (Schwarz, 2009).  
In relation to the many subsidiaries found in tax havens owned by multinational companies, 
may it be assumed that there could be a need for longtime protection and control of these 
economical interests. One could imagine that this could be done by a collaboration of the rich 
membership countries in the OECD. However, this is hard to prove since the OECD and its 
membership countries would not release such information of a common interest in removing 
countries and cut down the tax havens list.  
Since the OECD is currently updating and reducing their list of tax havens is it important to 
consider other criteria’s and measures to define tax havens. Often can rumors be enough to 
justify a tax haven. If somebody states that an island or a place is a tax haven, others may be 
convinced to believe the same. “The rumour criteria” can be explained as if others perceive a 
jurisdiction as a tax haven or if the jurisdiction presents itself as a tax haven, and then the 
jurisdiction is a tax haven.  The OECD used this rumour criterion in a report from 1987 
(OECD, 1998). It is also commonly used by the Tax Justice Network (Tax Justice Network, 
2007). 
The Tax Justice Network uses a wider and broader definition that also covers regimes with 
harmful preferential tax regimes (Tax Justice Network, 2007). Their list of jurisdictions 
classified as tax havens therefore includes more countries than the list of the OECD and 
examples of these countries are Switzerland, Singapore and South Africa (Tax Justice Network, 
2007).
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2.5  “Which countries become tax havens?” 
Another interesting matter to discuss is the reasons behind the birth of a tax haven. Many 
smart investors, companies and others are searching for the cheapest and best ways to make a 
profit. However, are there certainly also other reasons for the taxation differences between 
countries. 
Dharmapala and Hines published an article in 2006 with the title “Which countries become 
tax havens?” (Hines Jr. & Dharmapala, 2009). In this article the authors investigate tax havens 
and finds similarities between them (Hines Jr. & Dharmapala, 2009). They also focus on the 
reasons of the creation of tax havens. In their research they have excluded 9 countries from 
the OECD list, and included 8 other countries instead. Comparing their preferred list of tax 
havens with other countries and territories, did they found out that tax havens tended to be 
small countries with small territories. They also noted that tax havens had higher GDP per 
capita compared to other jurisdictions (Hines Jr. & Dharmapala, 2009). In addition to this, has 
their research discovered to a certain level that tax havens had less nature resources, used 
English as an official language and had a homogeny population.  
What has been clearly in the data, but not mention in the literature is that tax havens are 
achieving high scores in the measures of political stability, government effectiveness, rule of 
law, corruption control and measures of voice and accountability. In fact are there almost no 
badly and poorly governed tax havens due to statistics provided by Hines Jr. and Dharmapala 
in their article (Hines Jr. & Dharmapala, 2009).  What can the reasons then be why more well-
governed countries become tax havens? One factor could be that the returns may be higher in 
better-governed countries than in poorly. Foreign direct investment and the economic benefits 
that are included are more likely to involve tax benefits and reductions in better-governed 
countries than in worse-governed and poor countries (Hines Jr. & Dharmapala, 2009).                                           
It is also claimed that tax havens are totally unsuccessful without high quality governance. 
The data also indicates that most tax havens are small countries, often less than one million 
and that the countries have smaller natural resource endowments than other countries. 
In order to reveal the activities of tax havens is it necessary with a competent and functional 
taxation system (NOU, 2009). Developing countries are often lacking of resources, 
knowledge and capacity to construct and maintain a functional civil system, so they usually 
have a less efficient taxation system than in richer countries. This often leads to more tax 
evasion (NOU, 2009). In addition to this, are many of these countries experiencing difficulties 
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with corruption. The tax evasion as a crime is then often regarded as a minor offence in these 
developing countries.   
If one challenge people to reflect on the term tax haven, would many probably state that the 
term reminds and make them think of remote exotic islands perfectly set for a retirement. This 
could probably also be a description of some of those countries that become tax haven.  
This chapter has focused on explaining the basics of tax havens and the different definitions 
available to describe them. I have also shed light on some of the reasons for the birth of tax 
havens. The next chapter will focus more on the currently corporate structures used in tax 
havens. 
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3 Corporate structures and their use in tax havens 
I will now change the focus to the general inner laws of tax havens - how tax havens are run 
and the advantages they have. I will then continue with the most usual corporate structures 
used in tax havens, and try to compare these structures with other structures used in 
jurisdiction regarded as non tax haven countries according to the OECD.   
3.1 Tax haven in practice and the financial use 
There are a set of secrecy legislation in tax havens that provides security for companies using 
these jurisdictions. The confidentiality serves the foreign company in a way that the financial 
or other information exchanged between the company and the tax haven, cannot be sent or 
shared with a third-part. This is a part of the protection that a tax haven is claiming to provide 
the client. This secrecy is probably what attracts most investors and their capital to tax havens. 
It is almost impossible to find and extract information about the company for the stakeholders 
(NOU, 2009, s. 29). The only way to access information is through a legal request, and this is 
often just given under very strict conditions. This makes the process of collecting economical 
information especially difficult. In some cases, where one may encounter something of 
interest, can it then be very difficult to get any closer to the information hidden in the 
accounts.  
In order to make the right decisions does a decision maker need to have complete information. 
Transparency in the markets is important, so that decisions makers can operate and work in 
the best possible way. It is important to know who owns and runs the companies (NOU, 2009, 
s. 31). For example should all accounts be published and the audit should be done externally.  
The tax havens on the other hand have made rules for companies that are not doing business 
in their jurisdiction (NOU, 2009). Those who are in need of this information are the 
companies and jurisdictions in other countries. Tax havens do not care about the outside need 
for information, and have designed systems that make the sharing of information about 
ownership and the business optional for the owner of it (NOU, 2009, s. 31). 
The secrecy part makes it possible to hide the identity of the owners, their assets and their 
equity. The secrecy legislation also provides the possibility to hide and cut off the connection 
between a given start and end of a transaction. This feature makes it rather impossible to 
control how and where the asset originated and if it is legally obtained. It is the same with 
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securities in the financial market. Securities are favourable tools to for example hide 
information about transactions and to succeed with money laundry.  
The tax havens concentrate a lot in appearing more appealing and try to facilitate the 
conditions as much as possible for their clients. Reporting is minimal and the statutory 
obligation is often non-existing. If the audit and accounts need to be presented, are there no 
clear requirements on the whereabouts of the documents and the period of time they need to 
be held or available. This makes it even easier to avoid any guilt if a company based in a tax 
haven is found guilty in any crime, or even be put in front of a court.  
3.2 Corporate structures in tax havens 
There are offered many different corporate structures in tax havens. Some of them are applied 
more than others. I will discuss the corporate structures that are most likely to be found 
mostly in tax havens and try to investigate if there are similar structures used in non-tax haven 
countries. To be able to understand the functionality of the structures is it necessary to explain 
some fundamental parts of finance that involves these structures, and I will start with 
derivates.  
3.2.1 Derivatives 
Tax havens are an important part of the many transactions done in financial markets. 
Especially when it comes to securities like derivates have tax havens proved to perform a very 
convenient role. The secrecy and the other financial advantages offered in tax havens make it 
easier to exercise and design structures that tricks both rating companies and potential buyers.  
Today are derivates commonly used by banks and customers worldwide. A derivate is 
according to the investorworlds.com: “A financial instrument whose value depends upon the 
characteristic and value of an underlying, typically a commodity, bond, equity or currency.” 
(Investorworlds, 2011). There are many different types of derivates that provides different 
financial benefits. Some of the most popular and adopted ones are swaps, options and futures. 
Investors use the different types of derivatives if they for example want to: Speculate in the 
underlying
4
, hedge risk in the underlying, increase leverage or create options. One could 
describe it as an alternative investment tool that is frequently used by the brokerages, bankers 
and other investors.  
                                                 
4
 Underlying is a specified interest rate, security price, commodity price, foreign exchange rate, index of prices 
or rates, or other variable. An underlying can be a price/rate of an asset/liability, but it is not the asset/liability 
itself (FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 133 (FAS 133)) 
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The use of derivates has been one of the most important financial inventions the last 10-20 
years. Since the early 1990s, have brokers and others working in the financial sector 
developed and designed many new instruments or products, as they are called. With a boost of 
new products have also new financial institutions emerged every year. Some of these new 
financial companies introduce new products that promise to secure the customer against 
potential loss.  
A range of different credit derivates have been heavily used by customers lately and have 
gained a lot of popularity. Credit derivates are securities or bonds with a price that is 
dependent on underlying asset. There are many different credit derivates to choose from in the 
marked. Some are called structured savings products and other are called structured 
investment products. Some examples are Credit Default Swaps (CDS), Structured Investment 
Vehicles (SIV), Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO) and Asset Backed Security (ABS). The 
many names may create some confusion, but the main investment goal for all credit derivates 
is to hedge against loss in case the debtor with the mortgage goes bankrupt or breaches the 
loan.  
There have been argued that a credit derivate works in many ways as an insurance paper. 
There have also been argued the opposite. “Credit derivatives are not insurance” is the title of 
an article published by M. Todd Henderson (Henderson 2009). He believes that it would be 
wrong to “..argue that every contract in which a party could be said to reducing its risk and 
another party was willing to take on some of that risk is or should be called insurance” 
(Henderson, 2009). The insurance regulators had to regulate all types of swaps, options and 
many other contracts if this was indeed the matter. Generally it could seem like all sorts of 
contracts involves a bit of risk. To exemplify how credit derivate works, I will use a CDO and 
a CDS as examples. 
A Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO) is an instrument backed by an underlying portfolio 
with one or more securities, bonds or other assets (Rakkestad & Weme, 2006). Usually is a 
special corporation in charge of the financing of the underlying portfolio by issuing debt 
securities. These special corporations have many different names. “Special Purpose Vehicle” 
(SPV) and “Special Purpose Entity” are two names commonly used for these corporations. 
The SPE and SPV are also often referred to as “shadow banks” or “ghost corporations” 
throughout the media (The Economist, 2010). The PIMCO Manager Paul McCulley define 
shadow banks as “…entities that fund illiquid assets with short-term liabilities and yet remain 
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outside of the banking regulation” (Hsu & Moroz, 2009 ). The term shadow banks includes 
hedge funds, private equity groups, CDO structures and other similar entities. It is important 
to keep in mind that these shadow institutions are usually created by the banks or companies 
that are using them when they need them.  To illustrate visually, can one imagine shadow 
banks as an institution with no employees or assets until for example a deal is struck between 
an investor and a corporation. The ghost corporation could then work as a provider and 
channel the money between the investor and the corporation.  
If the bank should be able to remove the claims from the accounts, the SPV or SPE needs to 
be formally independent. To be able to fulfill this are the entities often created as subsidiaries 
of a given corporation. As many of the biggest corporations nowadays use the tax havens for 
financial reasons, they use them for setting up these shadow banks (Tavakoli, 2003). Today, 
many of these shadow banks are placed in tax havens like Bermuda, Cayman, Ireland and 
Jersey where it is easier to for example manipulate accounts and use the “benefits” that these 
financial centres provide. By selling credit derivates of a SPE, the bank is removing risky 
derivates from their asset inventory and “cleans” their balance (The Economist, 2007). 
The CDO often have multiple tranches with different degree of risk and return to meet the 
demand of the investors. There are usually three different tranches: Senior tranche, Mezzanine 
tranche and a Junior or Equity tranche. The Senior tranche often has the highest rating, AAA, 
provided by the rating agencies such as Standard & Poors, while the Mezzanine is often rated 
BBB (Rakkestad & Weme, 2006). These ratings give the investor an indication of how solid 
the CDO is. Adding all the tranches together and we have the capital structure of the CDO 
A CDO can be explained as a promise to provide payments based on the cash flow earned 
from the pool of bonds, securities or assets it owns. However, the instrument has its 
constraints. If the CDO is unable to pay all of its investors, the ones in the lower tranches 
suffer losses first. Both the high ratings provided by the ratings agencies and the different 
tranches separating the CDO were huge contributors to the financial crisis that started in 2007 
with the sub-prime mortgages crisis. I will return and elaborate more on this topic in the next 
chapter. 
An illustration of the structure of the CDO can be found on the next page. 
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Figure 1 Collateralized Debt Obligation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Excel your risk and finance career, 2011) and added extra details.  
The banks acquire many advantages by using CDOs. A bank could for example sell its assets 
or loans to a SPE and it would then be able to remove the assets from the balance sheet. The 
banks do not need to have coverage for these loans in equity and deposits when the loans are 
transformed into CDO. All the loans from the banks disappear from the balance, and the 
banks do not need to put the loans against its own equity on the liabilities side of the balance. 
This makes it possible for the banks to create unlimited credit.  
This transfer of risk is another huge advantage (Excel your risk and finance career, 2011). The 
risk transfer can be explained like this: The investors buy securities that represent different 
tranches that are arranged so that the banks are able to hedge and transfer credit risk (default 
risk) to the investors (Excel your risk and finance career, 2011). In case of a default, investors 
in the lower tranches may be obliged to take the losses, while the banks are secured.  
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To summarize one can argue that there are three motives to use CDO for the banks: Transfer 
risk to the investors, monetizing by receiving cash and shrink down the balance sheet. Then 
why does the investor invest in CDOs if it has so many benefits for the banks? They might 
enjoy high yields if they dare to take the risk. 
Another commonly known credit derivative is the Credit Default Swap (CDS). This is one of 
the simplest and most basic credit derivatives on the marked. One way of looking at it is to 
consider a swap contract agreement where the investor pays a CDS fee or spread for 
protection to the protection seller (Chander & Costa, 2010). It is a contract where the lender 
can protect himself against risk of default by paying for premiums to a third party or 
speculator that agrees to cover the lender in the event of default by the underlying borrower 
(Henderson, 2009). The borrower may default on the loan and both the speculator and the 
lender would then receive payment. The lender would always be protected by the CDS, while 
the speculator can only earn profit if the borrower defaults.  
When the loans are transformed into CDS is the original lender insuring himself completely 
against breaches of the loan and can continue to offer new loans.  
I have now explained how some the most commonly credit derivates with relations to tax 
havens are applied. I will now concentrate more on some of the most used corporate structure 
used in tax havens.  
3.2.2 IBC and PIC 
Tax havens offer many different types of corporate structures. Some of the most common 
companies are those that are not suppose to engage in any form of economical activities in the 
tax haven. These structures are called different names and some of them are known as 
International Business Corporations (IBCs), Personal Investment Corporations (PIC) or 
“mailbox companies”. The main advantages for applying these corporations are because they 
enjoy low or non-tax liability and often escape the need of audit. The secrecy rules allow them 
to keep an even lower profile. It is nearly impossible for an outsider to get any inside 
information. If a banker reveals any information about a customer is this regarded as a 
criminal offence. The assets of the customer are also protected from any political or 
economical crisis in the home-country of the settler (Mercantil Commerce Bank, 2011).  
The only requirement that tax havens usually put on the foreign companies that wants to use 
the tax havens, is that they are not allowed to do business in the haven that provide the 
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mailbox and the shell. It is notable that many of the banks that offer these structures have their 
headquarters in non-tax haven countries like the US (Mercantil Commerce Bank, 2011). 
3.2.3 The structure of the PCC and the ICC 
Another structure used in corporate finance is the Protected Cell Company (PCC). The PCC is 
a flexible structure that provides a cost effective platform of transactions operations. In 
general, were the cell structures introduced for use in umbrella investment funds
5
 and to 
support the management of investment pools (OGIER, 2009). 
The structure was first introduced in the 1970`s in Bermuda, but it was not before Guernsey in 
1997 started to actually use it, that it started to become very popular (Willis, 2008). The 
incorporation of PCC regulations in the last couple of years in Barbados, Bermuda, Malta, Isle 
of Man, Gibraltar and in many states in the US, illustrates the huge development that has 
happened in this market. Today in the US is the PCC used mainly for domestic insurers as a 
means of accessing other sources for capital and benefit from insurance securitization. There 
are many states like Illinois, Iowa, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont and Delaware that 
allows for the PCC structures (National Chengchi University, 2011). Delaware was along 
with Guernsey the first to introduce the use of PCC structures and they applied the Series 
LLC legislation (Feetham & Jones, 2010). The series LLC can be explained as a type of a 
limited liability company that provides liability protection between multiple series (Limited 
liability company center, 2010). Each series can have different economic structure, 
management, assets etcetera. Each of these series is protected from liabilities arising from 
other series. LLC are often formed to protect personal assets from legal claim that can be 
related to business liabilities (Limited liability company center, 2010). This LLC legislation 
has been approved in even more states like Texas, Utah, Tennessee and Illinois. This shows 
that the expansion of the phenonomen has strong links to PCC activities. 
The PCC structure is used more widely in the financial sector and in business services. It is 
especially used in multi-series asset backed securities issues and in structured equity products. 
PCC owned by the banks are also used as SPV to secure transactions (National Chengchi 
University, 2011).  
The PCC has many different names: “Segregated account company”, “segregated portfolio 
company” or “segregated cell company”. The PCC also operates almost identical to the 
                                                 
5
 Umbrella Investment funds can be explained investment with many different sub-funds in a single entity that is 
traded as an individual investment fund. 
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insurance structure called “rent-a-captive”, which is gaining more and more popularity after 
the financial crisis amongst corporations around the world. I will discuss the term rent-a-
captive later in this part of the chapter.  
In simple terms, the structure of the PCC can be described as a single entity with a core and a 
number of unlimited parts or cells that are segregated from each other. Each of these parts is 
legally independent and is held separated from each other and the core of the enterprise.  
Each of the parts has its own name, and their financial activities can be seen as totally isolated 
from each other. If one part experiences any type of financially problems, then the creditors 
can only claim the assets of that particular cell.  
The core itself consists of general assets or also known as “non-cellular” assets. The core can 
for example be share capital (Corporate options, 2012). While the cellular assets consist of 
assets attributable to the cells (so-called cell assets), the non-cellular assets are other assets 
and attributed to the core (so-called core-assets). The cells are in this way created by the core, 
and each cell is independent and protected from each other. The cells may consist of a 
property, an aircraft or another business (Corporate options, 2012).  
There are many ways to design possible structures, and the structures are tailored to the needs 
of the company or the person. I will continue by explaining more about the technical and 
general characteristic aspects of the structure. 
As the PCC is separated into two parts, the PCC also operates in that way. The core of the 
PCC provides each cell with separated services. The new cell owners pay little in 
establishment costs and they only need to provide risk capital. The core itself transfers the 
minimum capital requirements to each cell. The PCC as a whole, including both the core and 
the cells, is regarded as a single entity and this single entity only prepares one account that is 
audited and shared with the tax authorities. This aspect of audit makes it easier to hide and 
design an account in line with the preferences of the owners.  
The figure found on the next page illustrates the structure of the PCC.
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Figure 2 Protected Cell Company structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Willis, 2008) and added extra details. 
The legal separation makes it possible for each cell to do business as it fits them, without 
being worried about or affected by the dangers of possible losses due to the financial activities 
of other cells. Should for example one cell experience insolvency, will the creditors only have 
access to the cellular assets of that certain part, but in some cases also to the non-cellular 
assets of the core (Willis, 2008). If the assets of that particular cell are insufficient to cover the 
liabilities, the creditors may demand something from the non-cellular assets of the company.  
The PCC has no limits regarding the number of cells involved in the structure. The number of 
cells has the potential and opportunity to grow and increase infinite (National Chengchi 
University, 2011). The structure provides segregation between many subsidiaries and parent 
companies, and new and additional companies may be incorporated and added without 
complications. There are also ways to convert a PCC company to a conventional business, or 
convert ordinary companies to a PCC company (National Chengchi University, 2011). There 
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The core itself has limitations on the changes of core capital, which is different from each 
cell. Each cell has flexibility in capital. However, this capital has its constraints and it may be 
considered more as a guarantee fund. So if the there are changes in the company, the capital 
may be changed with the approval of the core (National Chengchi University, 2011).  
The main advantages of the structure may be argued to be the protection that each cell has, 
both financially and legally. Insolvency of one cell cannot affect the performance or business 
operations of any other cell or the entity as a whole. Another huge benefit of a PCC is the 
reduced costs of the designing and running the PCC compared to a more traditional company 
structure (Corporate options, 2012). It can be added that the PCC only submits one account 
for the whole structure. These characteristics make this structure a popular invention for both 
huge corporations and private investors. It is however important to keep in mind that the PCC 
is in general mostly allowed in tax havens. This is due to the fact that the PCC takes risk and 
isolates valuable assets used to take risk and then limiting their liability beyond what the 
majority of jurisdictions consider to be reasonable. 
In order to uncover anything from behind the core is a court ruling needed. If one should 
succeed in obtaining the right to open up the core it is still necessary with a court decisions for 
each cell individually. This may be very time consuming and occupy a lot of resources, and in 
many cases proves to be almost impossible to gain any information from the structure even if 
a court decision is obtained. 
The PCC is applied in many different financial areas, but the main using areas of the PCC can 
be categorized into three purposes: captive, collective investment schemes and special 
purpose vehicle (National Chengchi University, 2011). 
The first purpose, “captive”, is commonly used in tax havens. One type of these captives, 
called “rent-a-captive”, operates and functions on the same basis as the PCC. I will go through 
the term “captive” and discuss some different types of captives to be able to clarify the 
similarities between the rent-a-captive and the PCC. 
The financial term captive can be defined “as an insurance subsidiary of a company designed 
to insure or reinsure possible risks of its parent company” (LLC, 2011). The captive is not an 
entirely new concept, it has been around in the world of finance since the early 1900s. It all 
started with many captives that were formed by groups that pooled their risks together, and 
then obtained better combined terms and deals than the conventional insurance marked. This 
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was and is still a good solution for corporations that are in need of flexible and stable 
insurance deals where the ordinary insurance company cannot offer similar terms.  
One can evaluate the formation of captives as a reaction to the unfairness felt by many 
companies and investors. Many felt that the insurance companies were demanding too high 
premiums and wanted to avoid administration costs (LLC, 2011).  
There are several types of captives. A “single parent captive” is a company with one single 
owner to whom they offer insurance. The risk manager from the parent usually keeps an eye 
on them and a domiciled captive insurance manager has control of the captive.  
Another type of captive is the “industry captive”. These are structures that are controlled by 
companies in the same line of business that have come together to fix an insurance problem. 
The stockholders normally create a board of directors that the management of the companies 
has to report to.  
“Association captive” is a captive designed by a trade association of an industry to be able to 
offer insurance for the members. One example could be medical risks that are often insured 
this way. The responsibility of this captive usually lies in the hands of a financial expert from 
the association or with a captive insurance manager. This captive has been successfully 
operating for many years (Willis, 2008). However, has the structure somehow shown to be 
difficult to advert and sell. This is mostly due to the reluctance of the customers to share risk 
and information between corporations or private investors that meet in direct competition with 
each other (Willis, 2008). 
The “rent-a-captive” is the captive that resembles the PCC in the best way (Willis, 2008). The 
design of the “rent-a-captive” allows the participant to “rent” an infrastructure of a 
reinsurance business. The user needs to pay a cost for using the captive and is then required to 
cover with some sort of collateral so that the “rent-a-captive” is secured against any 
underwriting losses caused by the user. The participant does not need to create his own 
captive and this enables him to take on own risks with a self-insurance instrument that is 
flexible and convenient (Zurich Continental Europe Corporate, 2002). The owner of the PCC 
can provide rent-a-captive services with additional features like the segregation of assets and 
liabilities between different cells (Willis, 2008). The main difference between a rent-a-captive 
and a PCC is that the PCC entity allows the users to keep their funds from other renters in the 
captive as long as the owner of the “rent-a-captive” is solvent.  
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The figure below shows the general structure of a rent-a-captive. 
Figure 3 Rent-A-Captive 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Zurich Continental Europe Corporate, 2002) and added extra details. 
Using captive structures like the “rent-a-captive” can prove to have many advantages. The 
cash flow advantage makes the user able to time premium payments to work out with its 
current cash flow situation. The reinsurance opportunity is easier to obtain at a much lower 
cost without any additional fees. A more directly access to the reinsurance market can result 
in more successful underwriting that creates a surplus in the captive (LLC, 2011). The parent 
company can then manage to lower the need for reinsurance and increase retentions. The 
concept of the rent-a-captive has been widely and successfully throughout continental Europe 
and the model is starting to gain more popularity in new developed markets (Willis, 2008). 
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Different tailored solutions provide flexibility that increases risk management control and this 
is especially convenient for multinational corporations and their shareholders. For many 
corporations are the captives the only way to insure goods like hazardous products or waste, 
environmental pollution, war risk or devaluation. This coverage may be highly priced or 
totally unavailable in the common market and only offered in tax havens. Using captives also 
provides a more stable price without fluctuations and risks in the event of market cyclical 
changes.  
The captive produces investment income on capital and premiums during the period when 
losses are paid out. It is certainly a huge upside to save the investment income and the profit 
that went away to the insurance companies before. There are some operating costs using 
captives, but the expenses are nothing compare to using ordinary insurance companies. The 
tax advantage also adds up to the cost reduction. The level of tax paid depends on the location 
of captive. Many of the tax havens offer no corporate taxes, premium taxes or income taxes 
which cut the cost even more (LLC, 2011).   
Insurance companies often demand minimum capital and solvency margins, certain ratios of 
premiums according to net assets and sometimes also restrictions on investments. 
Corporations using captives may reduce the regulations and restrictions that are imposed by 
government. Some companies doing international business might experience problems with 
transfer of dividend payments due to national exchange control restrictions. Using a tax haven 
to setup a captive insurance can be beneficially for the user and can reduce the regulatory 
problems.  
All in all, is a captive a good solution for companies that are fed up with the traditional 
insurance market and wants to take advantage of risk transfer and cash flow opportunities. A 
captive gives a much greater degree of control than the ordinary insurance company can 
provide.  
More corporations start to search for new strategies to handle risk after the global financial 
crisis started to calm down in 2009. Captives are increasingly taking on a broader and more 
important role of companies risk management strategy (Captive Review, 2009). This is a 
structure that has been heavily used in tax havens for a long time. The structure is now being 
legalized in more and more states in North America, and this is probably a trend that will 
continue out in Europe (Captive Review, 2009). Could this be a start of integration of tax 
haven principles? It is striking that the approval of the rent-a-captive may introduce the 
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approval of the PCC structure in North America and European countries without tax haven 
semblance, due to the similarity in functionality between the two.   
In addition to the similarities of the rent-a-captive, the PCC also provides many other different 
mechanisms and services. I will now mention a few different uses off the PCC as a captive. 
Life insurance is a fast growing business, and the PCC can offer the insurance companies to 
segregate the pension, the assets and other funds. Insurance companies based in tax havens 
provide added protection to policyholders (Willis, 2008). Using different cells for individual 
product or policies ensure a decent segregation of risk. If a user of insurance decides to 
include general business and become composite, is the PCC allowed to do this without any 
separate insurance. 
The PCC can also provide insurance trading, where preferably an association with members 
that have common business interests may be able to access insurance arrangements that 
provide better prices than in the normal market. This is very similar to the “association 
captive”. At the same time does the PCC offer full legal protection for the assets of every 
individual member, by placing these in separate cells.  
The restructuring of global insurance programs is also possible with the PCC. This is done 
through a similar captive operation, where captive capital can be provided by a subsidiary 
instead of by the whole group. The segregated risk information that is available can be applied 
to identify needs of risk management (Willis, 2008). 
The PCC can also serve as an insurance or reinsurance company where the clients are 
provided with the services by the insurers or the reinsures (Willis, 2008). The structure can 
also be designed as a reinsurance company where finite reinsurance deals and contracts of 
securitization that can be appointed separate cells. 
Another used purpose of the PCC is the “collective investment schemes”. This second 
purpose can be defined as financial activities where the investing goal is to spread investment 
risk and provide shareholders of the company the benefit of the profits arising from the 
management of its funds (MITCO, 2011).  
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These collective investments schemes are regulated and are operated through a company or a 
trust
6
. The structure of a company could be a simple investment group or a PCC structure that 
provide different cells for individual classes or sub-funds. PCC are operated as investment 
funds, while these collective investment schemes are suitable for the operation of many funds 
simultaneously, using each cell as a sub-fund like the umbrella funds. To exemplify, one 
could imagine a sponsor that designs a multiple series fund by using a PCC, where each cell 
represent different types of investments and where the distinct series are offered to the 
investors of the fund. 
However, there are certain constraints and rules to follow for the users of these schemes: The 
users do not have daily control and access to the management of the property. The property 
itself is managed by the company or by an investment manager and under this condition, the 
payments made by the users and the profit made are all pooled (MITCO, 2011).  
The third purpose of the PCC structure is as a platform for Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) 
and that includes those transformer vehicles that support securitization transactions. These 
transactions can be carried out by the PCC issuing bond or other debt securities where the 
repayment is covered by the profit from the investment of the PCC. 
Using and structuring the SPV as a PCC can provide some huge advantages for the investor 
(Willis, 2008). It can provide the investor with the possibility of being able to segregate 
between the different classes of investors. To exemplify, can one imagine an investor that is 
extremely risk-loving that would want to risk both coupon and capital in exchange of the 
highest possible return. While other risk-averse investor would just want to risk their coupon 
and keep their capital secured by paying for capital protection
7
. The legal segregation of 
cellular assets is more important in the area of the SPV than for the vehicles of the rent-a-
captive. 
There are many advantages of the PCC function and operating as a transformer for segregated 
SPV facilities. The main advantage is all the experience that is gathered and put together 
while the costs for licenses, control and operation of each facility is reduced to a minimum. 
The expertise and the experience of many different SPV are then providing a more powerful 
                                                 
6
  A trust is a collection of assets where the formal owner has agreed to manage the assets for the benefit of the 
beneficiaries of the trust (NOU, 2009). 
 
7
 Some structure products offer capital protection. The bank would then put an amount a side of the investment 
and place it to a risk-free rate at the time needed to be able to payout the required sum. 
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structure than just the experience of one corporate vehicle (Willis, 2008). The PCC is already 
operational and ensures for example lower cost and exit entry than a single company for a 
SPV transaction (White Rock, 2007). The use of PCC as a SPV may facilitate the translation 
of the market transactions of capital into insurance transactions. Or the use of PCC as SPV 
may serve as risk transfer for securitization of the future income (National Chengchi 
University, 2011). The tax reduction and general cost reduction due to the location in for 
example a tax haven, make the PCC a very popular platform for many investors.   
There are many other popular corporate structures apart from the PCC structure. Another 
almost identical structure is the Incorporated Cell Companies (ICC). The difference between 
the PCC and ICC is that the ICC has a different approach to the cells than the PCC. The ICC 
incorporates the cells as separate and individual legal entities.                                       
However, are all these cells dependent on the cell company which is controlled by common 
board members (OGIER, 2009). To summarize, one can say that in an ICC is each cell a 
separate corporate entity, while in the PCC structure is not each cell a single corporate entity 
and has no separate identity (OGIER, 2009).  
The PCC and ICC are structures that provide a lot of advantages for its users. Their services 
can include trustable ring-fencing of cellular assets and liabilities. There are potential cost 
savings available due to the opportunity to reduce administrations and statutory fees. It is also 
easier to treat each cell according to the laws of the company. The two structures also provide 
the advantage that cells in the company may be able to invest in other cells in the same 
company (OGIER, 2009). 
3.2.4 The trust structure 
I have now mentioned and discussed two of the most common structures used in tax havens. I 
will now go through another very commonly used structure found in tax havens: The trust 
structure. 
According to the The Government Commission on Capital Flight from Poor Countries is a 
trust “… a collection of assets where the formal and legal owner of the assets (the “trustees” 
or managers) have agreed to manage the assets for the benefit of those who, according to the 
basis for establishment (the foundation agreement) are designated as beneficiaries of the trust 
(owners)” (NOU, 2009). The new trustees have then the obligation to follow the rules set by 
the owners. The rules are typically about how the asset should be handled and controlled. The 
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trustees then temporarily acquire the assets and are then legally the owners, but there are 
many ways to adjust the trust so that the beneficiaries are ending up with acquiring exactly 
want they demand.  
The illustration below shows the connection between the parties involved in a trust. 
Figure 4 Trust structure 
 
                           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Morrisey, 2008) and added extra details. 
In order to make sure that the trustee is keeping his part of the deal and do not break the 
agreement, the settlor may hire middle men or so-called “protectors” to instruct the manager 
of the trust (NOU, 2009). Another way could be to introduce secret agreements that allow the 
Beneficiaries 
”The person(s) in 
whose behalf the 
property and/or 
assets are held.” 
Trustee 
”The person 
obliged to 
manage the 
property and/or 
assets.” 
Settlor 
”The person 
who transfer 
property or 
assets to the 
trustees.” 
Trust 
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beneficiary to control the assets. Then the original owner still controls the asset, although the 
funds are not a part of his personal wealth (NOU, 2009). The original owner is not liable for 
taxes on the funds, and he cannot be held to account by creditor if the trustee goes bankrupt. 
For this position, the manager of the trust receives a wage for holding the formal ownership 
and due to his working hours.  
There are many advantages with trust-structures, but the main advantage is the difference 
between legally and real control over the assets. If the manager of the assets is living in a tax 
haven, will the assets be taxable in the tax haven, even though the beneficial is living in a 
country with normal taxes. The creditor may not be able to demand anything from the settlor, 
since the manager of the assets is the formal owner of them. If the beneficial is to receive 
anything from the trust, may they be taxed on these assets and the creditors may demand 
something. However, it may be difficult for the tax authorities to reveal the true beneficiaries 
that receive the funds. Usually do the beneficiaries have advanced systems to avoid the spread 
of information to the creditors and other searching for illegal transactions.  
3.3 Tax haven in traditional use and in new use 
One of the main reasons for using tax havens is the opportunity to turn and remove parts of 
the taxation from high tax countries to tax havens with low corporate taxes. This is the most 
obvious reason and there are many techniques and financial designs to reposition the taxation 
of companies.   
One commonly used technique is transfer pricing (NOU, 2009). For a multinational company 
there are two methods that are applied to be able to transfer gains from a high taxation 
jurisdiction to a low taxation jurisdiction. The first method used, is to overprice transactions 
from countries with low taxes to high-tax countries. This strategy will increase the taxable 
gain in the low tax country and decrease the taxable gain in the high tax country. One type of 
transfer pricing that is growing and is getting harder to spot and recognize, is the transfer of 
rights to intangibles (Gravelle, 2009). Considering a patent that is developed in the US and 
licensed to an affiliate in a country with low taxes, then the income will be transferred or 
shifted if the payment is lower than the true value of the license. When putting a price on 
goods are there usually many substitutes or methods that can be utilized to determine if an 
appropriate price has been set on the goods. These intangibles, like for examples the new 
patents on drugs, tend to have no similar goods to compare prices with and it is then difficult 
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to measure an appropriate price. Newly invented intangibles have the potential to cause major 
transfer pricing problems.   
The second method used involves structuring the balance sheet to reduce tax. The company 
could for example create subsidiaries with debt financing, and then locate them to a high-tax 
country. At the same time, could the company finance the subsidiaries in low tax countries 
with equity (NOU, 2009). Initially the banks are financed by equity and then the banks lend 
money to companies in the same group, but these companies are then located in countries 
with high tax (NOU, 2009). Many multinational companies prefer this method and it is often 
applied. The multinational company receives tax deductions on its debt in the high-tax 
countries when applying this strategy, and it usually does not pay taxes on the profit made 
internally.   
Some multinational companies also create an intermediate firm or a conduit entity in a third 
country that owns the subsidiary. This entity then functions as an intermediary between the 
company and the subsidiary in the transactions. This design opens up for more transactions 
options. The entity could receive equity and transfer these funds as a loan to the subsidiary, or 
it may receive a loan from the parent and transfer this money as equity (Mintz & 
Weichenrieder, 2010). 
It is clearly that the tax preferences of the different financing arrangements will depend on 
specific tax rates and system in the three countries involved. One example of tax reduction 
that has been heavily discussed is the “double dip situation”, where the interest deduction is 
used in two countries. This could happen if the parent company pulls out a loan and inject this 
loan as equity into a conduit company, while the conduit company forwards this money as an 
intra-company loan to the affiliate. Carrying out these transactions and both the parent of the 
multinational company and the affiliate, may use the tax deduction of the interest on the loans. 
In addition, the tax on the interest received by the conduit may be low if the conduit is located 
in jurisdiction with low taxes (Mintz & Weichenrieder, 2010). It seems like a sure thing that 
tax havens in particular have many advantages as being part of a design like this. 
The development of internet and electronic commerce has opened up for new offshore 
sectors. A business that converted to start handling most of its operations offshore is the 
online sex business (Palan, 2003). It is known that 1.5 % of all international phone traffic is 
categorized as telephone sex and it generates approximately 2 billion USD dollars a year 
(Palan, 2003). The core of this business is the international system which ensures that both the 
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country that makes the international call and the country in which it terminates, share the 
profit between themselves. This makes it possible for small developing countries to benefit if 
it can manage to a lot of incoming traffic of phone calls. One example of this system could be 
the small islands of Niue and Tuvalu in the pacific. These islands have leased their numbers 
and codes to big international firms that re-route online sex through these small countries. The 
origin of the customer that calls is hidden and the system provides the customer with 
anonymity. In other words, where these phone calls origin is unknown, but for the profit and 
because of the system itself are these phone calls set to originate in these small islands. Then 
the island of Niue shares the revenue from these calls with the big companies. This system 
provides the small countries and preferable tax havens, to earn huge amounts of money. 
Another small country in Latin America, Guyana, has also benefited from this phone service 
setup. In 1991 was the public telecommunication operations (PTO) in Guyana sold to an 
American company. After this did the volume of incoming calls increase from 23.8 million to 
139.7 million in 1995 (Palan, 2003). The revenue also increased to 130 million dollars that 
was equivalent to approximately 40 % of the total GDP of the country in 1993.  
Another offshore industry that is increasing massively is the online gambling. The total value 
of the online gambling industry grew to an impressive 29.8 billion dollars in 2010, which 
shows the magnitude of this business (Solomon, 2011). It is a fast growing industry, and it is 
primarily set up and located in tax havens. Companies simply use the benefits of tax havens 
and use it as a base and offer their services on the net.  
In the US has the US WIRE act managed to convict American gambling companies located in 
jurisdiction known as tax havens. British companies like sportingbet.com continued to offer 
their gambling services to American citizens until 2006, when the US passed a bill that denied 
banks from transferring money from US customers to online gambling sites (Debrebant, 
2009). However, are still online companies from countries apart from the US using tax havens 
as their headquarters, due to their national laws that say that the transactions take place where 
the web servers, the risk management and payment are located (Palan, 2003). 
Canada is a country that is in strong contrast with the US in terms of laws for online gambling 
businesses. In Canada is online gambling allowed and on top of that is it completely income 
tax free (Karen, 2010).  
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Setting up a gambling service may be illegal in many countries, however are international 
gambling companies very difficult to track down and locate and put in front of a court.  
I have now reviewed the most common structures found in tax havens and discussed their use. 
I have also mentioned some new forms of advantages and operations that the tax havens 
supply. In the next chapter will I look more on the current use of tax havens in financial 
markets.  
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4 Financial markets and the use of tax havens 
This part will concentrate more closely on possible effects done by tax havens to financial 
markets. I will be using the financial crisis as an example throughout the part and I will 
emphasize on the use of CDO and the negative contribution of the SIVs.  
4.1 Credit rating, asymmetric information and the financial crisis 
Structured products like the CDO, makes it possible for the original creditor to put high risk 
and low risk loans in different packages that get high safety grade ratings from big rating 
companies like Moody`s, Standard & Poor`s and Fitch. In the start of year 2000, a new era of 
credit derivates began to emerge. Backed by these high ratings obtained by the rating 
companies did the credit derivates start to gain enormous popularity. Unfortunately were these 
products a huge contributor to the mortgage crisis in the US and later the international 
financial crisis that started in 2007.  
The use and advantages of credit derivates in the US, tempted many banks to issue loans to 
persons or institutions with low credit rating and high risk of breaches. The amount of 
mortgages in the US between 2002 and 2006 increased by 15 % annually. The majority of 
these loans where so called subprime loans
8
. The customers who were acquiring these 
subprime loans were by the American bankers called “Ninjas”. This term referred to an 
individual with “no income, no job and no assets.” In addition to the loans provided to these 
ninjas, did the banks offer lenders with advantages like low interest rate and free installments 
in the first few years of the loaning period. This was a profitable strategy designed by bankers 
as long as the real estate prices where increasing and the interest rates were low. According to 
the Inside Mortgage Finance, was the total payout of subprime loans in the US of a total of 
2500 billion dollars in the period of 2002-2007. That was approximately 18 per cent of GDP 
in the US in 2007 (Inside Mortgage Finance, 2012).  
The reason why the banks were able to grant almost infinite amounts of loan, was because of 
the credit derivatives instrument available on the market. The banks had started to sell a major 
part of these loans along with other derivate in securized pools or “packages”. These 
“packages” of different derivatives were sold to different investors and investment banks 
worldwide, but mostly banks that were based in the US and Europe.  
                                                 
8
 Subprime loans are high risk loans given to person with very low credit rating. The only guaranty of the loan is 
the asset itself, for example a house.  
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These “packages” soon proved to involve and include a lot of problems. The main problem 
was based in the information part. Most of the buyers of these packages did not know what 
they really consisted of, but they felt comfortable because the payoff of these structured 
products was very good and it had been through many years. The idea of a great payoff was 
enough to convince investors to buy huge amounts of these products. To better understand the 
concept, can one imagine as a hedge fund
9
 that took on big bank loans with normal interest 
rate to be able to buy credit derivates that gave a much higher payoff. For investments like 
these could the banks loan up to 15 times their own equity. This resulted in high leverage that 
gave up to 2 % more payoff than the borrowing rate (The Economist, 2007). 
At the same time, did not the majority of the holders of mortgages have a clue that their loans 
were sold further into a bigger pool. This asymmetric information situation was not only high 
risk for the people owning just homes, but also for the banks that were taking on huge 
amounts of risk and were now playing with high stakes.  
It seems bad that the subprime mortgage pools were bought by investment banks and other 
financial institutions. But what was even worse, was that the speculators were even selling 
insurance over the securized pools of mortgages. They were selling insurance of whether 
these pools would default or not default (Gilani, 2008). One of these sellers of insurance was 
the company American International Group Inc (AIG) in the US. When the financial crisis 
struck did the AIG need to post a lot of collateral and post write downs, but it was not enough. 
At the end did a single corporate subsidiary crash the largest insurance company in the world 
(Gilani, 2008) 
The information asymmetry may represent a complex problem. On the one hand where the 
mortgage holders, “the ninjas”, that did not have sufficient liquidity or income to serve the 
interest, but still obtained a loan. On the other hand were the banks that were selling the 
mortgages packed to other investors that did not know the content of these packages. An 
interesting factor and matter is then to review what part the rating agencies that rated these 
derivates played in the crisis.  
An important reason for the interest of buying these “packages” of derivatives, was the ratings 
they received by the rating companies. For the rating businesses was this procedure of 
measuring and weighting these packages extremely lucrative (Lowenstein, 2008). As a 
                                                 
9
 A hedge fund is a portfolio of investments that can consist of many different investments, such as leveraged, 
short, long and derivatives positions in all types of markets. 
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consequence of the ratings, did not the banks need to wait 30 years to get their money back 
from the borrowers, they just sold their loans into securitized pools and the capital increased 
tremendously. Not only the banks increased their profit, also rating agencies like Moody’s 
acquired high returns. Moody’s went public, shares escalated and revenues went sky high and 
grew by 900 percent (Lowenstein, 2008). 
How could then Moody’s and other rating companies justify their ratings of mortgages 
securities? Did they know that the majority of the mortgage holders were so called Ninjas? 
Moody’s claimed that they did not have access to the individual loan files. They also stated 
that because of this, were they unable to communicate with the borrowers and could not 
verify the information they provided in their applications (Lowenstein, 2008). Moody 
therefore assigned analysts to evaluate the packages that the investment banks provided.  
The analysts did not have enough time to evaluate the information of the mortgages in the 
hectic climate of 2006. They decided instead to evaluate the bonds issued by the investment 
vehicle designed to house them (Lowenstein, 2008). This arrangement created very good 
ratings that especially benefited the rating agencies and the banks. However, did it not benefit 
the mortgage holders that did not know that their loans were pooled and sold to another party. 
Another matter which is necessary to discuss, focuses on the structure of these packages and 
why these structures did not collapse before the financial crisis. I will break down and analyze 
the structure of the packages to be able to comprehend this more easily. 
The structure of the SIV would usually consist of 12 classes of bonds, from normal AAA to 
low BA1 (Lowenstein, 2008). The highest rated bonds would be the first to receive the cash 
from the mortgage loaners, until their loans were fully paid. Then payments would persist 
with the next level of bonds, and so on until all were fully paid. The designed package 
provided segregation between the payments that protected the bonds on the top. With this 
composition of segregation and the lack of information regarding the mortgage part of the 
package, did Moody’s manage to classify these packages as AAA.  
The scenario can be illustrated with a wine bottle pouring wine on an upside-down pyramid 
with glasses of three levels (Leopold, 2009). The liquid in the bottle is the total amount of 
interest payments from subprime mortgages, while the bottle itself is the pool of subprime 
mortgages. The financial securities can be interpreted as the wine glasses and each row of the 
glasses represent a tranche. Each of the tranches then has different types of securities with 
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different levels of risk (Leopold, 2009). The interest is then poured as wine from top and 
downwards to pay all the investors. The top tranche, called the senior, gets the first taste of 
wine. This tranche is the safest one and then has the lowest return (Leopold, 2009). The 
second tranche, called the mezzanine, gets the next taste of interest payments. This tranche is 
a less protected and might be obliged to absorb losses in case of defaults. However, the 
securities from the mezzanine are safer than investing in the pool as a whole (Leopold, 2009). 
The last tranche, called the equity tranche (toxic tranche), gets the last taste of wine. This 
tranche takes the first hits and falls in case of default. Since this is the riskiest tranche does it 
also give a higher yield which again attracts investors (Leopold, 2009). 
Using the wine example as a visual demonstration, are we able to conclude that in some cases 
would not the bottles contain sufficient wine for all the glasses. However, would still the top 
trench always get the serving first.  
The next thing that happened was that the banks that were selling the derivates were able to 
convince the rating agencies that the top tranche was 100 per cent safe. This is the main idea 
of this illustration: That the senior trench is supposed to always be safe and secure investors 
against default. The senior trench also got very popular, because it received AAA ratings and 
had a higher return then other AAA securities (Leopold, 2009). The derivate sellers also 
managed to convince the raters that the mezzanine tranches were fairly secure and got 
acceptable investment grade ratings even on this level. The last tranche remained with junk-
bond status and was called “nuclear waste” 
This design developed AAA ratings for a lot of derivates in the pool and actually succeeded in 
getting more than 75% rated as AAA (Leopold, 2009). A very important question is then to 
ask what happened with the risky and toxic tranches at the bottom row. Due to the potential 
high returns on these equities they also got very popular. In 2007 was it also reported that 
state pension funds had bought as much as 18% of the most risky CDO tranches and only 4% 
of the AAA-rated tranches (Leopold, 2009). 
 
 
 
 
46 
 
The illustration of the concept with the wine and the glasses is illustrated below. 
 
                                    Figure 5 Subprime mortgages visual 
Source: (Leopold, 2009) 
For the original creditor is the spread of loss given by the credit derivates that secure a level 
of protection against default. It gives at the same time a spread of risk in case of a liquidity 
crisis and if parts of the credit system should fail. That was what happened during the real 
estate bubble in 2006/2007. A higher interest rate and a failing real estate marked, unleashed a 
boom of defaulting.  The loss was shared between the investors that had bought derivates with 
payoff and derivates that consisted of mortgages. The losses were enormous and the last 
estimate from the IMF in 2009 stated that the global losses for banks and other financial 
institutions would exceed 4 trillion dollars (IMF, 2009).  
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When the majority was losing a lot of money, was somebody earning a lot as well. We do not 
know exactly how much the derivates industry earned during this period. There is no doubt 
that it has to be a lot of money in it  for charging for designing the pools, create and marketing 
the securities, trade them and collect the massive returns from the equity trenches (Leopold, 
2009). 
When the derivate industry designed these derivates were they using SPV structures that were 
based in tax havens. The banks where giving out huge amounts of mortgages to “Ninjas”, and 
sold those loans mixed in packages rated as AAA derivates to SPV based in tax havens that 
resold them to a third party. So in a complicated way were tax havens directly linked to the 
transactions of popular derivates and an important part of the process of raising capital of the 
balance sheet (Lawler, 2001). As an alternative could the SPE be established in other 
jurisdictions, but the banking and trust structures in tax havens made it easier to arrange and 
design them. With a flexible legal and regulatory framework are there more advantages 
operating in for example the Caymans than in Los Angeles. I will now continue with focusing 
on the negative effects that affected the relationship between the banks. 
4.2 Credit derivatives and uncertainty 
It is claimed that credit derivates create a fundamental uncertainty in the financial world 
(Skarstein, 2009). In many cases is it unclear which banks that owns each derivate, and this 
may create trust issues between the different banks. The securities were made and designed to 
reduce risk of the original creditor, but have instead had the opposite effect in many cases and 
increased the total risk.  
In the summer of 2007 were banks with good liquidity not that eager to give credit to banks 
with low liquidity. The amount of credit transactions went down dramatically. In august the 
same year did the central bank what it could to prevent a disaster: It had to lend money with 
very low interest rate. This action only delayed the big financial crisis that struck the world 
the same year. 
Tax havens seem to have had a reinforcing effect on the financial crisis, because the tax 
havens brought upon different extra costs (NOU, 2009). The common trust between the banks 
did not become better when they knew the other bank had interest in jurisdictions with low 
taxation, no transparency and secrecy. As an individual, a bank or a company you may 
borrow too much and then hide it in a tax haven. They are able to do this because of the 
secrecy, but they are also then engaging in evasion of regulation and fines that would occur if 
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you were un-capitalized. In the end gives this the different players a competitive edge and this 
is applied in the financial marked and also in providing incentives for activities like illegal 
unreported fishing that was mentioned in the second chapter.  
In crisis would many banks terminate counterparty risk with companies that had a lot do with 
jurisdictions known as tax havens. This can be illustrated with an example of the four week 
US Treasury bill that was down to zero for parts of 2008. This US Treasury bill was heavily 
requested because the buyers knew its risk. When the uncertainty was hitting really high 
levels, were the investors better off with lending money free of charge to the government. 
They would not believe in a bank that was possibly doing business in a jurisdiction with no 
transparency, and a government with their own and different style that did not match the 
modern financial system (NOU, 2009). 
A fundamental question that needs to be raised is whether tax havens carried and inflicted too 
much debt during the finance crisis. Different tax incentives often run through tax havens and 
according to the Tax Justice Network did these incentives contribute greatly to the build-up of 
debt throughout the global financial system before the crisis struck (Tax Justice Network, 
2011b). Tax havens also assisted different corporations to conceal dramatic losses that also 
added and increased the number of more problems in the crisis (Tax Justice Network, 2011b). 
The next chapter will focus more on discussing the financial regulation, the location of the 
different financial entities and their possible contribution to the global financial crisis.  
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5 Tax haven influence and its future, conclusion and suggestions 
This part will concentrate more on the link between the tax havens and the global financial 
crisis that started in 2007, and it will also try to clarify any misunderstanding with this 
connection. I will also discuss the need for tax havens and possible scenarios of the future, 
come to a conclusion and provide suggestions for further research. 
5.1 The link between tax havens and the financial crisis 
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 led to the formation of the G-20 consisting of the 20 leading 
nations worldwide (Santillán-Salgado, 2011). The main reason for this formation was to 
improve and develop the coordination of different aspects and dimensions of the international 
economical environment (Santillán-Salgado, 2011).  
 
It was stated that in the G-20 summit in London 2009, that some of the fundamental causes of 
the financial crisis were “major failures in the financial regulation and supervision” (Maffini 
& Loomer, 2009). The G-20 leaders also concluded that they needed to “..take action against 
non-cooperative jurisdictions including tax havens. We stand ready to deploy sanctions to 
protect our public finances and financial systems.” Another important organ, OECD, also 
draws a clear link between the financial crisis and tax havens by stating: “Removing practices 
that facilitate tax evasion is part of a broader drive to clean up one of the more controversial 
sides of globalized economy.” These statements are important and aim to clarify the link 
between the recent financial crisis and tax havens. However, do they not explain sufficiently 
the exact role of the tax havens in the financial crisis (Maffini & Loomer, 2009). 
In order to comprehend and have more background information on this matter is it necessary 
to distinguish between three different concepts: Tax evasion, tax avoidance and financial 
regulation avoidance (Maffini & Loomer, 2009).  
 
I have highlighted and discussed tax evasion in the second chapter and it can be summarized 
as a criminal behaviour in general. Individuals or firms are deliberately doing concealment of 
taxable income. This is a behaviour that is punishable by jail and fines or even in some 
occasions both. The international taxation standard introduced by the OECD states that the 
countries should agree to exchange tax information when requested for the administration and 
enforcement of the requesting country domestic tax laws (OECD, 2011a). Its main focus is to 
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improve transparency in the process of exchanging information to prevent specific cases of 
tax evasion (Maffini & Loomer, 2009). In other words, has it nothing to do with financial 
regulation and international tax avoidance or that tax evasion was the main cause of the 
financial crisis (Maffini & Loomer, 2009).  
 
Tax avoidance and tax planning are other concepts that were introduced in the first part of the 
thesis, and they refer to structuring the affairs to reduce and minimize the tax liabilities to the 
minimum according and within the boundaries of the law (Maffini & Loomer, 2009). As 
mentioned before can this be accomplished successfully and completely legal. A common and 
most usual example of tax avoidance is the multinational companies that locate subsidiaries 
and their property in low tax jurisdictions. It is legal, but by many considered highly unethical 
and reduces the tax income for the country that should had received and had more available 
income for public finances (Maffini & Loomer, 2009).  
 
There is also a specific difference between tax evasion and tax planning to be more accurate. 
Tax evasion focuses on the illegal actions such as sham transactions and fabricated expenses, 
while tax planning are using the mentioned legal structures and methods to delay or reduce 
the tax in the best interest of the tax payer. Since tax planning is referred to as legal are many 
claiming in court that they have engaged in this activity. For individuals and companies this 
may be the case because they maybe received bad tax advice or that they intentionally made 
the choices. However, are many ending up with being convicted for tax evasion (IRS, 2012).   
 
There are different views on whether tax avoidance and tax planning can be considered to be 
legit or a criminal offence. When big financial institutions are experiencing losses and these 
are met by the domestic taxpayers, the tax avoidance activities carried out in low cost 
jurisdictions by these financial institutions are met by a lot of controversy. However, it is 
important to remember that the tax avoidance alone cannot be blamed for the collapse in the 
financial crisis. 
 
Financial regulation avoidance is on the other hand more linked up to the causes of the 
financial crisis. Financial regulation avoidance is many times conducted through tax havens 
with the use of SIVs, conduits, and other off-balance sheet and off-budget vehicles. All these 
types where in the centre of the events that set of the financial crisis, and most importantly 
and mentioned previously was the SIVs particularly influential. The SIVs were funds or 
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companies investing generally in asset-backed securities, and the SIVs were the first to 
experience liquidity problems with the sub-prime mortgages crisis in August 2007 (Maffini & 
Loomer, 2009).  
 
Many of these entities that contributed greatly to the financial collapse and eventually the 
crisis were located in tax havens, and have of course created some confusion of the role and 
the part of tax havens in this credit crunch. The “hidden” locations of these off balance sheets 
and vehicles are contributing to a system that lacks transparency. However, the main problem 
with these entities was not their offshore location but their off-balance sheet status (Maffini & 
Loomer, 2009). This is a very important point to highlight, because it led to asymmetric 
problems with information failures and low capital ratios. The financial institutions that were 
using SIVs were cheating with the regulation, but why didn’t they locate them in for example 
European countries like England? One of the reasons could be that they did not want anybody 
to find out the exact amount of debt that was being used. Hence, did they use tax havens to 
hide this sort of information. Tax authorities were and are able to locate the SIVs, but they are 
not able to judge and measure the exact amount of the debt, because it was located in a tax 
haven.  
The off-balance sheet status along with the business model and design of the SIVs, using 
short-dated commercial paper for the funding of investment in longer-dated assets, led to a lot 
of problems at the onset of the crisis (Maffini & Loomer, 2009). 
5.2 Do we need tax havens? 
The institutions that offer tax reduction services in tax havens often argue strongly for the 
need of offshore centres (Raftopoulos & Banks, 2009). They argue that the secrecy of banking 
is not a smokescreen for tax evasion and that the confidentiality is one of the core principles 
for banks all over the world. (Raftopoulos & Banks, 2009). It is not the issue that corporations 
and people wish to deliberately hide their financial information, is because they want to keep 
this information. It has also been argued that tax havens have many beneficial effects 
(Mitchell, 2009). There are a few arguments that are considered being good influential factors 
by the tax havens in the global economical perspective. In some cases are tax havens putting 
pressure on politicians and promoting lower tax rates in high-tax nations (Mitchell, 2009). It 
is less likely that the politicians will be greedy when they know taxpayers have options to 
avoid taxes. Even the OECD economists have admitted the facts that tax competition is 
functioning as a pro-growth force in the world economy (Mitchell, 2009). Lower tax rates 
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reduce the tax bias against saving and investing of money, and encourage people to save 
more.  
This saving leads us to the next argument that tax havens are generating higher living 
standards (Mitchell, 2009). The World Bank data shows that 9 out of the 13 richest countries 
in the world are tax havens, hence leading to big reductions of poverty in developing 
countries (Mitchell, 2009).  
 
Tax havens also promote better governance and this is a huge problem in developing 
countries (Hines Jr. & Dharmapala, 2009). It is also argued that tax havens promote more 
economical activity in the so-called high-tax jurisdictions (Mitchell, 2009). Generally 
speaking, do the countries with high taxes have better rules for inbound investment than for 
their own citizens. Politicians have understood that they need to fight for global investors. 
However, these are all arguments that are justifying the secrecy and many of the illegal 
actions that tax havens are applying. And many of the financial instruments used before the 
outbreak of the financial crisis are being justified  
 
The developed countries in many ways look at and consider the tax havens with their lack of 
transparency as one of the contributor and accelerator of the financial crisis (McLaren & 
Passant, 2010). To balance budgets in the future by having tax havens collect income tax for 
developed countries with large budget deficits, is generally not supported by the developing 
countries and the solution to budget deficits probably is not found in tax havens (McLaren & 
Passant, 2010). 
 
In order to confront and solve future challenges and crisis that may occur is action against 
global tax evasion necessary along with constantly improvement of the global financial 
regulation. However, these things are totally different. The promotion and improvement of 
exchange of transparent information for decreasing tax evasion has little to do with the 
financial crisis. The improvement of international financial regulation has a lot to do with the 
financial crisis, but is not a big part of the enforcement of tax. However, the only way to 
really affect international tax avoidance would be substantial improvement and development 
in the ways international income is taxed (Maffini & Loomer, 2009). This should preferably 
become the main focus of organizations like the OECD and the Tax Justice Network in their 
work for more sound and transparent financial markets.  
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5.3 The future of tax havens 
As we are currently struggling with another huge financial crisis in Europe at the moment are 
there indications that tax havens are contributing to a more insecure and less reliable financial 
system. There are several reasons why tax havens will continue to provide countries, 
multinationals companies and individuals with financial services. The whole economic system 
is dependent on the free flow of capital between different jurisdictions for securing future 
productivity and development (McLaren & Passant, 2010). The tax havens provide very good 
mechanism for exactly this to occur. Tax havens will also always be able to provide the 
service of holding capital for asset protection purposes and so-called high-net-worth 
individuals who do not have a specific country of residence. An example could be temporary 
residents and non-domiciled residents of different countries that will keep on using tax 
havens, because they have no legal obligation by law to pay income in the country were they 
are residing (McLaren & Passant, 2010). It is also highly possible that multinational 
companies continue to locate their captive insurance companies in tax havens and tax havens 
will probably continue to provide crucial functions for the insurance industry. It is evident that 
without the benefits of low taxes jurisdiction where premium income are invested, will many 
companies and individuals find it very difficult to purchase insurance cover or even not be 
able to cover them at all (McLaren & Passant, 2010). It is however ironic that the public that 
is protected and covered for injury and loss situations, is the ones that benefit from the 
location of these insurance companies.  
Multinational companies will probably continue and diverse their use of tax havens. One 
example could be the state of Delaware in the US, where big corporation probably will keep 
on with the incorporation of foreign subsidiary companies (McLaren & Passant, 2010). It is 
then very easy to draw a general conclusion to the future behavior of tax havens that they 
probably will continue to survive and flourish, because they provide a lower cost of capital 
worldwide and different concentrations of investment capital for the ongoing health of the 
system (McLaren & Passant, 2010).  
Different organizations and governments are trying to deal with the financial problems caused 
by tax havens with different levels of success. The OECD for instance, has tax information 
sharing agreements as bilateral agreements while the challenges of the tax havens often 
require multinational cooperation (Gillespie, 2009). However, is it argued that the biggest 
challenge and problem of the framework and approach applied by the OECD, is that it applies 
to individuals and not the big multinational companies (Gillespie, 2009). These multinational 
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companies are in many ways the main responsible for the majority of tax evasion and losses 
to the government in both northern and southern countries (Gillespie, 2009). It is then 
preferable that the organizations like the OECD investigate new ways to reveal complex 
corporate structures, profit laundering and illegal transfer pricing.  
Another challenge that has arose after the financial crisis is the lack of trust between the 
customer and bankers. The collapse of trust may have serious implications for the future of 
the financial industry (Guiso, 2010). If not moving away from ambiguous securities that are 
structured with the aid of tax havens to more safer ones, it may affect the availability and the 
cost of equity financing (Guiso, 2010). Investors may not be willing to bear risk and it may 
limit the raising of capital to the industry in general.  
5.4 Conclusion and further research 
Tax havens are affecting our financial markets in many different ways, both positive and 
negative. The increasing use of captives for instance in risk management strategy for 
insurance companies, can be positive and beneficially for both the user and the company. 
There are also argued that tax havens have other positive effects like promoting better 
governance, more economical activity and that people are saving more with low taxes.  
However, tax avoidance and lack of transparency in tax havens are also contributing to huge 
uncertainties in our financial markets. The increasing use of structured investment vehicles 
conducted through tax havens and the lack of financial regulation may have a very negative 
effect on our financial markets. This can lead to asymmetric information failures and low 
capital ratios, like what happened during the previous global financial crisis with the off-
balance sheet status of the financial entities. 
It is in our best interest to focus on developing our global financial regulation. The 
international tax avoidance must be taken seriously and has to be improved in a sustainable 
way to secure more transparent global financial markets. 
There are many research areas to investigate further that could be beneficial for the 
improvement of a more sound and transparent financial market. Suggested research areas 
could be to investigate more about the direct effects of the off balance sheet status of SIVs, 
and for example try to measure the numerical impact done by tax havens in the financial 
crisis. Other research areas could be to focus on the current developing of new PCC structures 
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that are legalized worldwide and investigate the possible effect of the implementation of these 
structures in our financial markets. 
In order to improve our international taxation system, is it crucial to increase our knowledge 
of the damage that for example tax havens are responsible for. It is then vital that continuing 
research in the area of international taxation is prioritized, to be able to understand the impact 
of tax havens in financial markets.  
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